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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in its 
assessment of defendant's argument that plaintiff breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Review of the 
district court's grant of summary judgment is for correctness, 
according no deference to that court's legal conclusions. Brown 
v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 953 (Utah 1998). On certiorari review, 
the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, 
not the decision of the district court. See Massey v. Griffiths, 
2007 UT 10, 1 8, 152 P.3d 312. This issued was presented in the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 9-14. 
2. Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming 
the district court's award of attorney fees. The standard of 
review on appeal of the amount of a district court's award of 
attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion. 
Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 1127, 130 P.3d 325 (citing 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998)). On 
certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals, not the decision of the district court. See 
Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, 1 8, 152 P.3d 312. This issued 
1 
was presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages 14-
19. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order 
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise 
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within 
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the 
other parties a proposed order in conformity with the 
court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be 
filed within five days after service. The party preparing 
the order shall file the proposed order upon being served 
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda 
and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, course and disposition of proceedings. 
This is an action for damages in which plaintiff asserts a 
claim for breach of contract based upon defendant Carlos Marin's 
failure to meet certain "performance guarantees" detailed in the 
written contract between the parties. Mr. Marin does not dispute 
that he failed to meet his performance guarantees. It is Mr. 
Marin's contention, however, that plaintiff's prior material 
breach of the contract excused him from his performance 
guarantees. Specifically, Mr. Marin contends that plaintiff 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inherent in the contractual relationship between the parties when 
it failed to cooperate in providing Mr. Marin with the marketing 
tools which were necessary in order for Mr. Marin to meet his 
performance guarantees. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in plaintiff's 
favor, rejecting Mr. Marin's defense on the basis that "[i]t is 
well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a 
written agreement." See Addendum 2. The trial court also 
reasoned that the parol evidence rule barred the testimony which 
Mr. Marin offered to prove his claim. See Addendum 2. The Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed. See Addendum 1. 
The trial court also awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney 
fees. See Addendum 3. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed,. See 
Addendum 1. 
II. Statement: of Facts 
1. Plaintiff is in the business of manufacturing and selling 
therapeutic grade essential oils and wellness supplements. 
Historically, plaintiff has sold its products through a network 
of individuals who are for the most part practitioners of 
alternative medicine, massage therapists, and quasi-naturopath 
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non-licensed wellness enthusiasts. When plaintiff's 
representatives first contacted Mr. Marin, they represented to 
Mr. Marin that they desired to increase their company's sales 
volume using a mainstream network marketing model, i.e., 
marketing their products through traditional network marketing 
sales representatives directly to the individual consumer. 
Plaintiff's representatives were aware of the fact that Mr. Marin 
had previously built a global network of more than 500,000 
distributors for Amway Corporation using a mainstream network 
marketing model and they wanted Mr. Marin to accomplish similar 
results for plaintiff. (R. 0126) 
2. The parties entered into a Field Advisor to Executive 
Board Distributor Agreement on January 12, 2005 (hereinafter the 
"Agreement"). (R. 0090) 
3. Paragraph 18 of the Agreement provides that "there are no 
representations, warranties, or other agreements between the 
Parties in connection with the subject matter hereof except as 
specifically set forth herein." (R. 0082) 
4. Under paragraph 4 of the Agreement, plaintiff promised to 
pay Mr. Marin advance payments of: 
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005); 
$25,000 on 15 February 2005; 
$25,000 on 15 March 2005; and 
$25,000 on 15 April 2005. 
(R. 0089) 
5. Under paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement, Mr. Marin agreed 
that he would meet the following performance guarantees of 
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates: 
$5,000 by 15 February 2005; 
$30,000 by 15 March 2005; 
$100,000 by 15 April 2005; 
$300,000 by 15 May 2005; 
$600,000 by 15 June 2005; and 
$900,000 by 15 July 2005. 
(R. 0089) 
6. On January 12, 2005, in connection with the execution of 
the Agreement, plaintiff paid a $25,000 advance to Mr. Marin. 
(R. 0368) 
7. By February 15, 2005, Mr. Marin met his $5,000 cumulative 
"auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under paragraph 
3.4 of the Agreement. (R. 0368) 
8. Accordingly, on February 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr. 
Marin another $25,000 advance. (R. 0368) 
9. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his $30,000 cumulative auto 
ship sales volume performance guarantee by March 15, 2005 in 
accordance with paragraph 3.4 of the Agreement. (R. 0368) 
10. On March 15, 2005, plaintiff paid Mr. Marin another 
$15,000 advance. (R. 0368) 
11. Mr. Marin was unable to meet his April 15, 2005 
performance guarantee by April 15, 2005. (R. 0368) 
12. Prior to the parties' execution of the Agreement, 
plaintiff represented to Mr. Marin that it was nearing completion 
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of a new mainstream marketing website, recruiting DVD, audio CD, 
and other marketing materials (hereinafter referred to as the 
"marketing tools'7) . It was understood by both plaintiff and Mr. 
Marin that these marketing tools would be necessary in order for 
Mr. Marin to be able to meet his performance guarantees under the 
Agreement and it was represented to Mr. Marin that they would be 
available for use by February 1, 2005. (R. 0126-0125) 
13. Unfortunately, while plaintiff repeatedly promised to do 
so, it failed to provide Mr. Marin with any of the necessary 
marketing tools (except for one mediocre but expensive brochure 
which Mr. Marin's distributors were not interested in 
purchasing). (R. 0125) 
14. On or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to 
provide the marketing tools as promised, Mr. Marin contacted Gary 
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David Stirling, 
plaintiffs' Chief Operating Officer, with his growing concerns 
about his ability to meet his performance guarantees. Mr. Young 
and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to 
perform as promised, assured Mr. Marin that his inability to 
satisfy his performance guarantees would not affect his receipt 
of the advance payment of $25,000 due February 15, 2005, and 
expressed their confidence that the marketing tools would be 
ready for Mr. Marin's use by mid-February to early March 2005. 
(R. 0125-0124) 
15. On or about March 16, 2005, Steve Bentley, plaintiff's 
Chief Financial Officer, informed Mr. Marin that due to Mr. 
Marin's failure to meet his March 15, 2005 performance guarantee, 
plaintiff was considering withholding further payment to Mr. 
Marin under the Agreement. In response, Mr. Marin made it very 
clear to Mr. Bentley that his failure to satisfy his performance 
guarantee was the unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure to 
provide the promised marketing tools, that he could and would 
meet his performance guarantees when the tools were provided, and 
that he expected plaintiff to continue making payment to him in 
accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Mr. Bentley 
acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to perform as promised, 
represented that plaintiff anticipated that its website would be 
completed within approximately two weeks, and stated that 
plaintiff would be making a partial $15,000 payment to Mr. Marin. 
(R. 0124) 
16. On April 12, 2005, Mr. Marin spoke again with Gary Young 
regarding plaintiffs failure to provide the marketing tools. 
Mr. Young responded by telling Mr. Marin that he would "get to 
the bottom" of the problem and see what he could do. (R. 0124-
0123) 
17. Despite its acknowledgment that it had failed to provide 
Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which he needed to do his job, 
and despite its requests for Mr. Marin to remain patient while it 
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continued in its efforts to provide the marketing tools, 
plaintiff failed to pay Mr. Marin $10,000 of the advance payment 
due March 15, 2005 in accordance with paragraph 4 of the 
Agreement and failed to make any of the $25,000 advance payment 
due to be paid to Mr. Marin on April 15, 2005. (R. 0123) 
18. On April 26, 2005, Mr. Marin telephoned Mr. Stirling 
regarding plaintiffs failure to provide the promised marketing 
tools. Mr. Stirling again assured Mr. Marin that they would be 
provided soon and again requested that Mr. Marin be patient. (R. 
0123) 
19. On May 3, 2007, Mr. Stirling notified Mr. Marin that he 
had received an e-mail from Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., "John's 
folks") "which indicated they are making progress" on the 
website. Mr. Stirling asked Mr. Marin to "hold tight." Thus, 49 
days after plaintiff stopped making payments to Mr. Marin in 
accordance with the Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had 
still not provided Mr. Marin with the marketing tools which were 
absolutely essential for him to be able to do his job and 
requested his continued patience. (R. 0123)I 
20. On or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not 
provided any of the marketing tools which Mr. Marin needed in 
order to do his job, Mr. Marin spoke with Mr. Young and informed 
him that he believed he had been patient long enough in waiting 
for the repeatedly promised marketing tools and that he could no 
longer afford to continue to his contractual relationship with 
plaintiff. (R. 0123-0122) 
21. The Complaint commencing this action was filed on July 
26, 2006. (R. 0023) 
22. Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on March 21, 2007. (R. 0105) Mr. Marin filed his Response to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007. (R. 0111) 
23. Following a hearing held October 1, 2007, the trial 
court issued its Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and denying Mr. Marin's Counter-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 04 62) 
24. On May 27, 2008, plaintiff filed a Motion for Order of 
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth 
and Sixth Cause of Action. (R. 0495) On that same date, 
plaintiff submitted a Proposed Final Judgment and an Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (R. 0505) 
25. Mr. Marin served his Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed 
Final Judgment and Fee Affidavit on June 7, 2008. However, the 
Objection was not filed with the trial court until June 11, 2008. 
(R. 0499) 
26. On June 12, 2008, the trial court entered a Final 
Judgment in which it awarded plaintiff $61,362.43 in compensatory 
damages and awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney fees. (R. 
9 
0505) 
27. Mr. Marin filed his Notice of Appeal on July 14, 2008. 
(R. 0514) 
28. The Utah Court of Appeals filed its MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) affirming the trial court's ruling 
on September 24, 2009. (See Addendum 1) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF MR. MARIN'S 
ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
The trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment based upon the undisputed fact that Mr. Marin 
failed to meet his "performance guarantees." In opposing summary 
judgment, Mr. Marin does not deny that he failed to meet his 
performance guarantees. Rather, it is Mr. Marin's contention 
that plaintiff's prior material breach of its obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin from further performance 
under the Agreement. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Master Protection 
Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994) (one party's material 
breach excuses the other party's further performance). 
Specifically, Mr. Marin contends that plaintiff's failure to 
provide him with the marketing tools which he needed in order to 
satisfy his performance guarantees constitutes a prior material 
breach of plaintiff's obligation to cooperate with Mr. Marin and 
to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectations and 
i n 
with the parties' agreed common purpose, thereby excusing Mr. 
Marin from his performance guarantees. See Rawson v. Conover, 
2001 UT 24, 1 44, 20 P.3d 876 (a party must act consistently with 
the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the 
other party). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rejection of 
Mr. Marin's defense, concluding that "*[w]hile a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, . .  . this 
covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or 
duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante.'"1 The court 
of appeals also agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the 
parol evidence rule barred the testimony which Mr. Marin offered 
to prove his claim.2 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the court of appeals 
erred in its assessment his argument. Mr. Marin's testimony was 
not offered for the purpose of proving "new, independent rights 
or duties" or a "contemporaneous oral agreement." It was offered 
to show the parties' purpose, intentions and Mr. Marin's 
justified expectations, which, as discussed below, is in 
accordance with this Court's decisions in Brown v. Moore, 973 
P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998); St. Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 2001)/ and Rawson v. Conover, 2001 
Addendum 1 at p. 3. 
2Addendum 1 at p. 3. 
11 
UT 24, 1 44, 20 P.3d 876, as well as those of other panels of the 
court of appeals. See Andolex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 
1041, 1048 (Utah App. 1994). 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
The trial court's award of attorney fees is unconscionable 
and unjustified. This is a very simple breach of contract case 
in which neither party conducted any discovery and which was 
decided on summary judgment. Nevertheless, the trial court 
awarded plaintiff $43,903 in attorney fees. The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court's award on the ground that Mr. Marin's 
objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit was filed seven days late 
and, therefore, his arguments with respect to the fee award "are 
waived on appeal."3 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the court of appeals 
erred in affirming the trial court's award of attorney fees. 
"Waiver" is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a 
known right. See, e.g., Gifis Law Dictionary at p. 222. Mr. 
Marin may have filed his objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit 
seven days late. However, there is nothing which would support 
the conclusion that he did so intentionally, much less that he 
intentionally and voluntarily relinquished his right to appeal 
the attorney fee award. 
3Addendum 1 at p.4. 
Further, even if Mr. Marin's objection to plaintiff's fee 
affidavit was untimely, the Court of Appeals could still have 
considered the issue of fees because the trial court committed 
plain error and this case involves exceptional circumstances. 
See, e.g., View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MS'ICO, 2004 UT App 
104, f 37, 90 P.3d 1042 (citing State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) (appellate courts will generally not 
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal unless the 
trial court committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumstances). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF MR. MARIN'S 
ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is premised 
on Mr. Marin's breach of contract as alleged in the First Cause 
of Action set forth in plaintiff's Complaint. Specifically, 
plaintiff alleges that Mr. Marin breached the Agreement by 
failing to meet his "performance guarantees." 
In opposing plaintiff's motion, Mr. Marin does not deny that 
he failed to meet his performance guarantees. It is Mr. Marin's 
contention that plaintiff's failure to provide him with the 
marketing tools which were necessary for him to satisfy his 
performance guarantees was a prior material breach of plaintiff s 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing which excused Mr. Marin 
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from further performance under the Agreement, and specifically 
excused him from his performance guarantees. See, e.g., Holbrook 
v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 
1994)(one party's material breach excuses the other party's 
further performance). 
Under Utah law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing inheres to all contractual relationships. See, e.g., 
Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, fl 44, 20 P.3d 876. In order to 
comply with its obligation of good faith and fair dealing, 
"... a party must act consistently Vith the agreed common 
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party.' 
In analyzing for compliance with the covenant, both the 
contract language and the course of dealings between the 
parties should be considered to determine the parties' 
purpose, intentions, and expectations." 
Id. (quoting St. Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 
194, 200 (Utah 2001) (other citation omitted) (emphasis added); see 
also Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998)(same); and 
Andolex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah App. 
1994)(same). Particularly applicable to the case at bar, this 
means that "one party may not render it difficult or impossible 
for the other to continue performance and then take advantage of 
the nonperformance he has caused." Zion's Properties, Inc. v. 
Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); see also Markham v. 
Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, 1 18, 173 P.3d 865 (same); and PDQ Lube 
Center, Inc. V. Ruber, 949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utah App. 1997)(same); 
see generally Gregorson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 373 n.9 (Utah 
1980)("parties are obligated to cooperate with each other in good 
faith in the performance of a contact"). 
In his Affidavit submitted in opposition to plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (see paragraphs 12-19 of the 
Statement of Facts above), Mr. Marin offered testimony regarding 
the parties' course of dealings and conduct for the purpose of 
proving the parties' purpose, intentions and Mr. Marin's 
justified expectations. (R. 0126-0122) Mr. Marin's respectfully 
submits that his testimony is sufficient to establish issues of 
fact as to whether plaintiff failed to act consistently with the 
parties' agreed upon common purpose of marketing and distributing 
plaintiff's product through a mainstream network marketing model, 
whether plaintiff failed to act consistently with Mr. Marin's 
justified expectation that plaintiff would provide him with the 
marketing tools necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy 
his performance guarantees, and whether plaintiff made it 
difficult or impossible for Mr. Marin to meet his performance 
guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of the non-
performance which it caused. 
The court of appeals, however, affirmed the trial court 
rejection of Mr. Marin's defense on the basis that "*[w]hile a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every 
contract, ... this covenant cannot be read to establish new, 
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independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree 
ex ante.'"4 The court of appeals also agreed with the trial 
court's conclusion that the parol evidence rule barred the 
testimony which Mr. Marin offered to prove his claim: "we reject 
Marin's argument that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing can be used to incorporate extrinsic evidence of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties' agreement was 
integrated and the alleged oral agreement was not part of xthe 
express covenants and promises of the contract.'" Addendum 1 at 
p. 3 (quoting Seare v. University of Utah Sch. of Med., 882 P. 2d 
673, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial court's and 
the Court of Appeals' conclusions are erroneous. Mr. Marin's 
testimony was not offered for the purpose of proving "new, 
independent rights or duties" or a "contemporaneous oral 
agreement." It was offered to show the parties' purpose, 
intentions and Mr. Marin's justified expectations. 
(A) Mr. Marin is not attempting to impose new, independent: 
duties into the parties' Agreement. 
The court of appeals was correct in recognizing this Court's 
ruling in Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, 2004 UT 101, 1 45, 
104 P.3d 1226, that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
"cannot be read to establish new, independent rights or duties to 
4Addendum 1 at p. 3. 
which the parties did not agree ex ante.'"5 However, the court 
of appeals erred in its assessment of Mr. Marin's defense because 
it failed to reconcile that ruling with this Court's rulings in 
Brown, St. Benedict's Development, and Rawson, supra, that in 
analyzing for compliance with the covenant good faith and fair 
dealing trial courts should consider not just the contract 
language, but also the course of dealings and conduct of the 
parties in order to determine their purpose, intentions, and 
expectations. 
In Brown the Court explained that "[i]n determining whether 
a party has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
we are not limited to an examination of the express contractual 
provisions; we will also consider the course of dealing between 
the parties." 973 P.2d at 954 (citations omitted)(emphasis 
added). The Brown plaintiffs had purchased all of the stock of 
Western Heritage Thrift and Loan pursuant to an agreement which 
they entered into with the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions (DFI). Because the plaintiffs were not infusing new 
capital sufficient to meet the minimum requirements under Utah 
law, "DFI told plaintiffs that the necessary additional capital 
could be supplied by the Utah Industrial Loan Guaranty 
Corporation's (ILGC) purchase of $2,000,000 of "net worth 
certificates' from Western Heritage, which DFI would recognize as 
5Addendum 1 at p. 3. 
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cash equivalents for accounting purposes in meeting 
capitalization requirements." 973 P.2d at 952. Approximately 
two years later, the ILGC became insolvent and, as a consequence, 
Western Heritage became a failing depository institution because 
it was no longer able to use the net worth certificates in 
calculating its operating capital. Following DFI's seizure of 
Western Heritage due to its failure to maintain adequate capital, 
the plaintiffs filed suit claiming, inter al^a, that "DFI 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
taking possession of Western Heritage before the lapse of a 
period sufficient to permit them to recover their investment. 
Plaintiffs assert[ed] that ... DFI was obligated to continue 
crediting the ILGC net worth certificates toward capital 
requirements imposed by State law." 973 P.2d at 954. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in DFI's favor and 
this Court affirmed, explaining the analytical framework for its 
decision as follows: 
In this case, an examination of the contract language 
reveals no express obligation on the part of DFI to allow 
plaintiffs to operate Western Heritage for a sufficient 
period to recoup their investment. Nor is there any 
language which guarantees that DFI will continue to count 
the net worth certificates toward capital requirements for 
any specific amount of time... Thus, if plaintiffs are to 
defeat summary judgment, the course of dealings between the 
parties must disclose some other obligation, express or 
implied, on the part of DFI which could give rise to a 
breach of the covenant of good faith an$ fair dealing. 
Id. (emphasis added). Because it found nothing in the course of 
dealings between the parties which supported the plaintiffs' 
defense, the Court affirmed the summary judgment order: 
"Because no express or implied obligations of or 
representations by DFI indicated that DFI would recognize 
the net worth certificates regardless of the ILGC's 
financial condition, DFI's eventual decision to discontinue 
doing so cannot form the basis of a breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. A contrary holding would 
Establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon 
by the parties.'" 
973 P.2d at 955 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
In short, the Brown Court clearly recognized that: (1) a 
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing may arise from obligations or representations, 
express or implied, which are not found in the language of the 
contract itself; and (2) that a cause of action based upon 
obligations or representation not found in the language of the 
contract itself does not necessarily "establish new, independent 
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." See also, St. 
Benedicts Dev., supra, 811 P.2d at 200 (the Court examined the 
"parties' conduct" in finding that the plaintiff had stated a 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing); and Myers, supra, 871 P.2d at 1048 (parties' "course of 
dealings" failed to establish a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing). 
Whether there has been a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally 
inappropriate for decision as a matter of law. Republic Group, 
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Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no disputed 
material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 
950, 953 (Utah 1998). "Because disposition of a case by summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt 
concerning questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor 
of the party opposing the motion." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson 
Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that 
summary judgment was not appropriate because his testimony 
regarding the parties' course of dealing and conduct is 
sufficient to establish issues of fact as to: (a) whether 
plaintiff failed to act consistently with the parties' agreed 
upon common purpose of marketing and distributing plaintiff's 
product through a mainstream network marketing model; (b) whether 
plaintiff failed to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified 
expectation that plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the 
marketing tools necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy 
his performance guarantees; and (c) whether plaintiff failed to 
cooperate in providing the necessary marketing tools thereby 
making it difficult or impossible for Mr. Ma^in to meet his 
performance guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of 
the non-performance which it caused. 
Because there is a dispute as to these material issues of 
fact, the court of appeals erred in its assessment of Mr. Marin's 
argument that plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
(B) The parol evidence rule is not implicated because the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres 
to all contractual relationships. 
Also erroneous is the court of appeals' determination that 
the parol evidence rule barred Mr. Marin's testimony regarding 
the parties' course of dealings, conduct and justified 
expectations. The parol evidence rule has a "very narrow 
application," and operates only to exclude evidence of statements 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated agreement. Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 
20, 1 11, 182 P.3d 326 (quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & 
Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995). The covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, however, inheres in every contract 
as a matter of law. See, e.g., Oakwood Village, LLC v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 1 45, 104 P.3d 1226. Accordingly, 
because the covenant was already part of the contract at issue in 
this case as a matter of law, it follows that Mr. Marinfs 
testimony regarding the parties' purpose, intentions and 
expectations was not "offered for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of" the contract. The parol evidence rule 
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does not, therefore, operate to bar Mr. Marin's testimony. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
(A) The trial court's award of attorney fees is 
unconscionable and plainly erroneous. The Court of Appeals' 
decision to affirm that award is in conflict with a number 
of Supreme Court decisions. 
This is a very simple breach of contract case in which 
neither party conducted any discovery and which was decided on 
summary judgment. Nevertheless, the trial court awarded 
plaintiff $43,903 in attorney fees. Mr. Marin believes that this 
amount is unconscionable and unjustifiable. The court of 
appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's award on the ground 
that Mr. Marin's objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit was filed 
seven days late and, therefore, his arguments with respect to the 
fee award "are waived on appeal."6 
At the outset, the court of appeals' conclusion that Mr. 
Marin "waived" his arguments with respect to the issue of 
attorney fees is clearly erroneous. "Waiver" is an intentional 
and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. See, e.g., Gifis 
Law Dictionary at p. 222. Mr. Marin may have filed his objection 
to plaintiff's fee affidavit seven days late. However, there is 
nothing which would support the conclusion that he did so 
intentionally, much less that he intentionally and voluntarily 
relinquished his right to appeal the attorney fee award. 
6Addendum 1 at p. 4. 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the actual basis for 
court of appeals' decision is Mr. Marin's failure to preserve the 
issue of attorney fees for appeal. However, even if Mr. Marin's 
objection to plaintiff's fee affidavit was untimely, the court of 
appeals could still have considered the issue of fees because the 
trial court committed plain error and this case involves 
exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., View Condominium Owners 
Ass'n v. MSICO, 2004 UT App 104, 1 37, 90 P.3d 1042 (citing State 
v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) (appellate 
courts will generally not consider an issue raised for the first 
time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or 
the case involves exceptional circumstances). 
(1) The trial court failed to make findings of fact 
supported by the evidence and appropriate conclusions 
of law. 
"An award of attorney fees must generally be made on the 
basis of findings of fact supported by the evidence and 
appropriate conclusions of law." Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 
622, 624 (Utah 1985)(citing Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 
103 (Utah 1983))(other citations omitted). One of the issues 
before the Court in Cabrera was whether the trial court committed 
plain error in awarding attorney fees without making a finding of 
reasonableness. The Court upheld the award even though the trial 
court did not enter findings and conclusions separate from its 
order and judgment because the order and judgment itself 
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contained findings and legal conclusions, including a finding 
that the fee award was reasonable. 694 P.2d at 625. 
In the case at bar, however, the trial court did not make 
any findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to 
plaintiff's attorney fee request. And, unlike Cajbrera, there is 
no finding of reasonableness in the Final Judgment. 
(2) Plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney fees 
related to its tort and other non-contract claims. 
In Utah, attorney fees are recoverable only if authorized by 
statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988)(citations omitted). In the case at bar, an award 
of attorney fees is authorized by paragraph 6.1 of the Agreement 
between the parties. (R. 10) 
In its Complaint, however, plaintiff alleges six causes of 
action, entitled in order: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Unjust 
Enrichment; (3) Quantum Meruit; (4) Fraud; (5) Breach of Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (6) Negligent 
Misrepresentation. After the trial court granted summary 
judgment with respect to the breach of contract claim alleged in 
its First Cause of Action, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its 
Second through Sixth Causes of Action. Accordingly, the only 
cause of action with respect to which plaintiff might be entitled 
to an award of attorney fees is the breach of contract claim 
alleged in the First Cause of Action. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in plaintiff's 
favor on the breach of contract claim at the conclusion of the 
hearing held October 1, 2007. Yet, plaintiff seeks to recover 
tens of thousands of dollars in attorney fees incurred during the 
eight months after that date (R. 470-465), nearly all of which 
were related either to the tort and non-contract claims alleged 
in the Second through Sixth Causes of Action or to litigating 
"Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Form of Order" and 
"Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider" upon which plaintiff did not 
prevail. (R. 392, 448) 
In Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, the Court 
recognized not only that an award of attorney fees must be based 
upon "specific findings of fact," but also that the party 
requesting attorney fees must "categorize the time and fees 
expended for ^successful claims for which there may be an 
entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which 
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to 
attorney fees.'" Id. at 1132 (quoting Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 
52, 54 (Utah 1998). 
Noncompliance with these requirements makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, for the trial court to award the moving 
party fees because there is insufficient evidence to support 
the award. 
Id. 
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In the case at bar, not only did the trial court commit 
plain error by not making specific findings of fact, but it did 
not have sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees 
because plaintiff failed to categorize its fee request. (R. 492) 
(3) Plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney fees in 
connection with issues on which it did not prevail. 
The trial court committed plain error by awarding plaintiff 
attorney fees in connection with matters on which it did not 
prevail. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah 1998)("the 
court should not reimburse counsel for time spent pursuing 
ungrounded and infeasible theories of recovery); and Gardner v. 
Madsen, 949 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(trial court should 
make adjustments to fee request so that the prevailing party 
"does not recover fees attributable to issues on which he did not 
prevail"). Plaintiff seeks thousands of dollars in attorney fees 
incurred in litigating "Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's 
Proposed Form of Order" and "Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider." 
(R. 470-465) The trial court, however, sustained Mr. Marin's 
objections to plaintiff's proposed form of order (R. 392) and 
denied plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. (R. 448) Mr. Marin 
respectfully submits that it was plainly erroneous for the trial 
court to reimburse plaintiff for time spent on ungrounded and 
infeasible theories and upon matters on which it did not prevail. 
(4) The award of attorney fees rewards inefficiency. 
Calculation of the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In determining the 
amount of a reasonable fee, the trial court may consider, inter 
alia, "the difficulty of the litigation, [and] the efficiency of 
the attorneys in presenting the case..." Id. (quoting Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983). This was not a 
difficult case. The only issue which the trial court was 
required to determine in order to grant summary judgment was 
whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
plaintiff's prior material breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing excused Mr. Marin's performance under the 
Agreement. This was a relatively simple issue which should have 
required very little attorney time to address. It certainly 
should not have required tens of thousands of dollars. 
Accordingly, if plaintiff did spend that kind of time, it did so 
inefficiently and Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the trial 
court committed plain error by ordering him to pay for that kind 
of inefficiency. 
(B) This Case Involves Exceptional Circumstances. 
Finally, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that the following 
exceptional circumstances would have justified the court of 
appeals' consideration of the issue of attorney fees. 
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(1) Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 7. 
Plaintiff failed to comply with the time requirements of 
Rule 7, URCP, and should not be heard to complain of Mr. Marin's 
failure to do so. Plaintiff filed its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on March 21, 2007. (R. 74) Mr. Marin timely filed his 
Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Counter-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 4, 2007. (R. 119) 
Plaintiff, however, did not file its reply/response memorandum 
until August 13, 2007, nearly four months late. (R. 170) 
Similarly, the Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was entered March 26, 2008. (R. 462) In 
accordance with Rule 7(f)(2), plaintiff should have served a 
proposed form of judgment within ''fifteen days after the court's 
decision." The Proposed Final Judgment was not served until May 
27, 2008, 44 days late. (R. 505) 
(2) The trial court did not proceed in accordance with 
Rule 7. 
As the following chronology demonstrates, the trial court 
did not proceed in accordance with Rule 7, URCP. 
1. The Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment was entered March 26, 2008. (R. 462) That Order, 
however, was not a final judgment because it "adjudicat[ed] fewer 
than all [of plaintiff's] claims." See Rule 54(b), URCP. 
2. Accordingly, in order to obtain a final judgment, on May 
27, 2008, plaintiff filed the following documents with the trial 
court: 
Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action 
Proposed Final Judgment 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs 
(R. 492, 502 and 505) 
3. In accordance with Rules 6(a), 6(e), and 7(c)(1), URCP, 
Mr. Marin had until June 13, 2008, in which to file his 
memorandum in response to plaintiff's Motion for Order of 
Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth 
and Sixth Causes of Action. 
4. Mr. Marin filed his objection to plaintiff's attorney fee 
affidavit and to the provision for attorney fees and costs 
included in the Proposed Final Judgment on June 11, 2008. (R. 
499) 
5. Mr. Marin timely filed his response to plaintiff's Motion 
for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action on June 13, 2008. (R. 
507) 
6. Plaintiff then filed its Reply in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Order of Voluntary Dismissal on June 23, 2008. (R. 
29 
510) 
7. In the meantime, on June 12, 2008, the trial court 
prematurely entered the Order of Voluntary Dismissal of 
Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of 
Action and the Final Judgment. (R. 502, 505) It did so not only 
prior to the filing of Mr. Marin's response memorandum, but prior 
to the time when Mr. Marin's response memorandum was due, prior 
to the filing of plaintiff's reply memorandum, and without either 
party having filed a "Request to Submit for Decision" in 
accordance with Rule 7(d), URCP. 
8. The Proposed Final Judgment does not contain a Rule 54(b) 
certification7 and, accordingly, was "subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all of the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Rule 54(b), 
URCP. The Proposed Final Judgment was, therefore, subject to 
revision at any time prior to the entry of the Order of Voluntary 
Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
Causes of Action. Because Mr. Marin had until June 13, 2008, in 
which to file his memorandum in response to plaintiff's Motion 
for Order of Voluntary Dismissal of Plaintiff's Second, Third, 
7
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action ... the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims ... only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment." Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, and plaintiff then had 
until June 23, 2008 in which to file a reply memorandum, the 
earliest date upon which Rule 7, URCP, would have authorized the 
trial court to enter the Order of Voluntary Dismissal of 
Plaintiff's Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of 
Action was June 23, 2008. The Proposed Final Judgment should, 
therefore, have been subject to revision under Rule 54(b) at 
least through June 23, 2008. Mr. Marin's objection to 
plaintiff s attorney fee affidavit and to the provision for 
attorney fees and costs included in the Proposed Final Judgment 
was filed 12 days prior to that date on June 11, 2008. The trial 
court could, therefore, have revised the Proposed Final Judgment 
in accordance with Mr. Marin's objection if it had proceeded in 
accordance with the requirements of Rule 7, URCP. 
In short, because neither plaintiff nor the trial court 
proceeded in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7, it would 
not be reasonable to now hold Mr. Marin strictly to those 
requirements. Accordingly, Mr. Marin respectfully submits that 
this case involves exceptional circumstances under which the 
court of appeals could have and should have considered Mr. 
Marin's arguments with respect to the trial court's attorney fee 
award despite Mr. Marin's not having preserved the issue for 
appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Marin respectfully requests that 
the Memorandum Decision of the court of appeals be reversed and 
that this action be remanded to the court of appeals with 
instructions for remand to the trial court for a trial on the 
merits. -
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McHUGH, Judge: 
Carlos Marin appeals from the trial court's order granting 
partial summary judgment in favor of Young Living Essential Oils, 
LC (Young Living). Marin had defaulted on the parties' contract 
by failing to meet certain "performance guarantees" detailed in 
the agreement. On appeal, Marin argues that the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Young Living. 
Marin also contests the trial court's award of attorney fees and 
costs to"Young Living. We affirm. 
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for 
correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
On appeal, Marin does not deny that he failed to meet the 
performance guarantees contained in the contract. Rather, Marin 
claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
because there was a material issue of fact relating to whether 
Young Living breached its obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that a 
grant of summary judgment is proper where "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact") . In support of this claim, Marin 
relies on an affidavit he submitted in opposition to Young 
Living's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In his affidavit, 
Marin avers that Young Living failed "to provide him with the 
marketing tools [that] were necessary for him to satisfy his 
performance guarantees." Young Living counters that Marin's 
affidavit cannot raise a material issue of fact because it 
constitutes parol evidence offered to insert additional terms 
into the parties' written agreement. 
The parol evidence rule "operates, in the absence of fraud 
or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 
20, f 11, 182 P.3d 326 (emphasis and internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Thus, if a contract is integrated, parol evidence is 
admissible only to clarify ambiguous terms . . . ." Id. In 
determining the admissibility of parol evidence the court must 
begin by "determin [ing] whether the agreement is integrated." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
An integrated agreement is "a writing . . . constituting a 
final expression of one or more terms of an agreement." Id. f 12 
(internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen parties have reduced 
to writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement, 
it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that 
the writing contains the whole of the agreement between the 
parties." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that "we will not allow extrinsic 
evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on the question 
of integration in the face of a clear integration clause." Id. 
1 16. 
Here, the agreement signed by the parties includes a 
provision titled "Entire Agreement, " which reads, in part, 
This Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement between the Parties hereto 
pertaining to the subject matter hereof and 
supersedes all prior and contemporaneous 
agreements and understandings of the Parties, 
and there are no representations, warranties, 
or other agreements between the Parties in 
connection with the subject matter hereof 
except as specifically set forth herein. 
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Thus, Marin's agreement with Young Living was integrated because 
the parties signed a written contract including a clear 
integration clause. See id. Furthermore, Marin makes no claim 
that the language of the agreement was ambiguous. Therefore, the 
parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to 
vary or add terms to the parties' integrated agreement. See id. 
% 1 8 . 
Marin argues that the parol evidence rule does not prohibit 
the introduction of evidence that Young Living breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Marin reasons 
that "[b]ecause the covenant was already part of the contract at 
issue[,] . . . [his] testimony in support of his claim for breach 
of the covenant was not 'offered for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of' the contract." "While a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inheres in almost every contract, . . . 
this covenant cannot be read to establish new, independent rights 
or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante." Oakwood 
Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f 45, 104 P.3d 1226. 
Rather, the covenant is "implied in contracts to protect the 
express covenants and promises of the contract." Seare v. 
University of Utah Sch. of Med., 882 P.2d 673, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Marin reasons that Young Living breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing because it failed to provide him 
promised marketing tools, but no obligation regarding marketing 
tools was made part of the written agreement. Therefore, we 
reject Marin's argument that the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing can be used to incorporate extrinsic evidence of 
a contemporaneous oral agreement, where the parties' agreement 
was integrated and the alleged oral agreement was not part of 
"the express covenants and promises of the contract." Id. 
Finally, Marin contests the trial court's award of attorney 
fees and costs to Young Living. Young Living counters that Marin 
waived his arguments on attorney fees and costs on appeal because 
his objection was not timely filed in the trial court. "To 
preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have raised a 
timely and specific objection before the trial court. We will 
not address an issue if it is not preserved or if the appellant 
has not established other grounds for seeking review." H.U.F. v. 
W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, fl 25, 203 P.3d 943 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure instructs 
that "[o] bjections to [a] proposed order shall be filed within 
five days after service." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). Young Living 
served its Proposed Final Judgment and Affidavit of Attorney[] 
Fees and Costs on May 27, 2008. Marin then had five days as 
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provided by rule 7(f) (2), see id., along with an additional three 
days following service by mail, see id. R. 6(e), to file his 
objection. Marin's objection was not filed until June 11, 2008, 
making it untimely, and his arguments, therefore, are waived on 
appeal.1 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
6 jri* 
Carolyn^ McHugh, Judge, 
WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregory>^.^"T)rme, Judge 
1. Marin argues that exceptional circumstances warrant our 
consideration of his arguments as to attorney fees and costs 
because during the course of the litigation Young Living also 
failed to comply with filing deadlines. However, Young Living's 
failings do not excuse Marin's untimely filing. 
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YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARLOS MARIN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 060402237 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Division 1 
Plaintiff Young Living Essential Oils, LC ("Plaintiff) is a Utah limited liability company. 
Defendant Carlos Marin ("Defendant") is an individual who resides in Miami, Florida. The 
matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. 
I. Undisputed Material Facts 
The following undisputed facts are taken from the parties' pleadings with citations to the 
record omitted. 
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A. Valid Contract 
After negotiations, Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, executed a written agreement 
("Agreement") with Defendant on 12 January 2005. 
In their Agreement, Defendant expressly represented and warranted that he had 
"significant experience as a Distributor/Leader", had "numerous contacts with potential 
Distributor/Leaders" whom he could "bring to the Company and sign as new distributors with 
the Company", and had "successful, favorable experience in providing Services such as the 
duties as contemplated herein." 
Paragraph 18, the last paragraph of their Agreement directly above the signature blocks, 
is labeled "Entire Agreement" (underline in original) and states in part: "there are no 
representations, warranties, or other agreements between the Parties in connection with the 
subject matter hereof except as specifically set forth herein." 
B. Plaintiffs Obligations 
Under paragraph 4 of their Agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant advance 
payments of 
$25,000 on execution of the Agreement (12 January 2005); 
$25,000 on 15 February 2005; 
$25,000 on 15 March 2005, and 
$25,000 on 15 April 2005. 
According to their Agreement, these advances and other specified performance bonuses 
were to help Defendant devote "all his time and attention into [sic] recruiting additional 
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distributors underneath him and training them" and were expressly intended "to entice 
[Defendant] to quickly build an organization by devoting the necessary time to it. Also, [they] 
will provide him with a quick resource of cash to build the business." 
Under paragraphs 4 and 4.1, these advanced amounts were to be offset by any payments 
due Defendant for commissions and "Fast Cash" bonuses. 
Under paragraph 4.3, Plaintiff gave Defendant a product credit of $5,000 for January 
2005, and $5,000 for February 2005 "to be used for samples in attracting new 
Distributor/Leaders." 
C. Defendant's Obligations 
Under paragraph 3.3 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed to "devote his full time and 
attention to recruiting new Distributor/Leaders" to sell Plaintiffs products. 
Under paragraph 3.4 of their Agreement, Defendant agreed that he would meet the 
following performance guarantees of cumulative "auto ship" sales volume by the specified dates; 
$5,000 by 15 February 2005; 
$30,000 by 15 March 2005; 
$100,000 by 15 April 2005; 
$300,000 by 15 May 2005; 
$600,000 by 15 June 2005, and 
$900,000 by 15 July 2005. 
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Paragraph 6.1 of their Agreement provides for Defendant's payment of Plaintiffs "loss 
and damage" and "legal fees" arising from "contravention . . . of any of the terms and conditions 
imposed on [Defendant] pursuant to this Agreement." 
D. Plaintiffs Performance and Defendant's Breach 
On 12 January 2005, in connection with the execution of their Agreement, Plaintiff paid 
Defendant a $25,000 advance. 
On 15 February 2005, Defendant met his $5,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales volume 
performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
Accordingly, on 15 February 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $25,000 advance. 
On 15 March 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his $30,000 cumulative "auto ship" sales 
volume performance guarantee under paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
On 15 March 2005, Plaintiff paid Defendant another $15,000 advance based on 
Defendant's representation that he would meet his 15 March 2005 performance guarantee of 
$30,000 in cumulative sales volume by 15 April 2005. 
On 15 April 2005, Defendant had failed to meet his 15 March 2005 $30,000 (let alone his 
15 April 2005 $ 100,000) cumulative "auto ship" sales volume performance guarantee under 
paragraph 3.4 of his Agreement. 
Through June 2006, Defendant had generated a grand total of less than $36,000 in 
cumulative "auto ship" sales volume. 
E. Damages 
Plaintiff paid Defendant $65,000.00 in advances. 
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In 2005 and 2006, Defendant earned a total of $3,637.57 in commissions from Plaintiff. 
Defendant never earned "Fast Cash" bonus payments. 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states that the "monies advanced to [Defendant] will be 
offset by any payments due [Defendant] under the Fast Cash Program as calculated below. Also, 
these payments will be offset by any commission payments due [Defendant] each month as 
calculated by the standard commission payout plan. . . . If any of the advanced amounts are not 
repaid by the commission payouts or Fast Cash at the end of the guaranteed payments, these 
amounts will be deducted from any future commission payout. . . ." 
II. Discussion 
A. Legal Standards 
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
Rule 56; see also Billings ex. rel. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991). 
2. Contract Interpretation. "[Interpretation of a contract is a question of law." 
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 561 (Utah 1983), citing Morris v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983). "A completely integrated 
agreement must be interpreted on its face." Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 98 P.3d 15 f 
28 (Utah 2004). 
3. Material Breach Excuses Nonbreaching Party's Further Performance. "The law 
is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by 
the nonbreaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 
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1994), citing, Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah App. 1992); Wright v. Westside 
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1990). 
4. Prejudgment Interest. Prejudgment interest may be recovered where the damage is 
complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss is measurable by 
facts and figures. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). "Unless parties to a 
lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-1 (2006). 
B. Elements of Proof for a Breach of Contract Claim 
To prevail on its breach of contract claim, Plaintiff must prove (1) a valid contract, (2) 
performance by Plaintiff, (3) breach by Defendant, and (4) damages. Bair v. Axiom Design, 
L.L.C., 20 P.3d 388, 392 1f 14 (Utah 2001). 
Each of these elements is undisputed based on the parties' submissions. 
C. Defendant's Claims 
However, Defendant claims that his performance was excused because of Plaintiff s prior 
material breach of an oral term by failing to provide "marketing tools" by a purported deadline. 
Defendant also claims that his assertions concern a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. At oral argument, Defendant's counsel argued and directed the Court's attention to the 
Restatement of Contracts, Second § 216, and to FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 
P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1980) in support of Defendant's position that the contract was not 
completely integrated. 
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Defendant's claims are without merit. 
1. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Defendant's claim of Plaintiff s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is misplaced. It is well settled that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot be used to impose new, independent duties in a written agreement. Slicex, Inc. v. 
Aeroflex Colorado Springs, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74234 n.l ('The implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is 'implied in contracts uto protect the express covenants or promises 
of the contract."' ... c[T]he doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not serve to import new 
obligations into a contract. It merely controls how the obligations stated within the contract are to 
be performed.'"). 
2. The Parol Evidence Rule 
Defendant's claim that Plaintiff breached a purported oral term necessarily implicates the 
parol evidence rule. It is well settled that "the [parol evidence] rule operates, in the absence of 
fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous conversations, 
representations, or statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 
1995) (italics in original) citing inter alia Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah 
1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981). 
Under the parol evidence rule, the Court must undertake a two-step analysis. First, is the 
parties' Agreement integrated? Second, did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud? 
a. Is the Agreement integrated? "[BJefore considering the applicability of the parol 
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evidence rule in a contract dispute, the Court must first determine that the parties intended the 
writing to be an integration. To resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is 
admissible." Hall, 890 P.2d at 1026. 
Based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court concludes as a 
preliminary matter that the parties intended their Agreement to be a complete integration and the 
final expression of their agreement. 
The Court's determination is based in part on the express integration provision directly 
over Defendant's signature in the Agreement itself which Defendant has neither disputed nor 
explained. Although not conclusive, the Court finds this express provision particularly 
persuasive. 
Further, the Agreement itself sets out in detail the rights and obligations of the parties, 
including various deadlines for their performance. It therefore begs the question: if, as 
Defendant contends, the purported term that Plaintiff breached was so critical to Defendant's 
performance, why was it not included in the parties' Agreement? 
Finally, the email communications between Defendant and Plaintiff submitted to the Court 
are devoid of any reference by Defendant to Plaintiffs breach of this purported critical term. 
The Court finds particularly persuasive an email exchange between Defendant and Plaintiffs 
general counsel on February 3, 2005, two days after the deadline Defendant contends that 
Plaintiff was to provide promised "marketing tools". Instead of complaining about how 
Plaintiffs recent breach would prevent his further performance, Defendant represented that he 
could expand Plaintiffs business into several foreign markets. Indeed, In the submissions before 
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the Court, there is no written notice of the purported breach to give Plaintiff the contractually-
required 10-day opportunity to cure. 
The Court notes that oral representations of additional terms have been accepted by other 
courts notwithstanding an integration clause in a written agreement. But those cases are most 
often in the context of a construction contract where the performance of the parties manifests 
their agreement or consent to "extras" beyond a written agreement. Therefore, those cases are 
distinguishable. 
Further, Defendant's assertions of Plaintiff s representations lack foundation as to the 
circumstances including who made the purported representation or representations and when 
such representations were made. 
In sum, based on all the relevant evidence submitted by the parties, the Court rejects 
Defendant's assertions that the parties intended to be bound by terms not found in their written 
Agreement and concludes as a threshold matter that the parties' Agreement was integrated. 
b. Did Defendant claim ambiguity or fraud? 
Nowhere in his pleadings or submissions to this Court did Defendant claim that the parties' 
Agreement was ambiguous or that it was induced by fraud. On the contrary, he contended that 
the Agreement was-a% "valid contract" but that Plaintiff was the one who breached it. 
Thus, in the absence of any claim of fraud or ambiguity, Defendant's assertions offered for 
the purpose of adding to the terms of the parties' integrated Agreement must be excluded. Hall, 
890 P.2d at 1026-27. 
As to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim involving a product credit Plaintiff provided to 
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Defendant, Defendant's order of product in excess of that credit, and the amount due to Plaintiff, 
the Court finds that there is a dispute as to the material facts. Therefore, the Court denies any 
relief to Plaintiff on that portion of its breach of contract claim at this point in the proceedings. 
Plaintiffs Remedy 
Based on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law (and pursuant to the parties' 
Agreement), Plaintiff is entitled to the difference between the advances it paid to Defendant 
($65,000.00) and the commissions Defendant earned ($3,637.57). Plaintiff is thus entitled to 
damages in the amount of $61,362.43. 
Because that damage amount was complete and fixed as of April 15, 2005 and is 
measurable by facts and figures, Plaintiff is also entitled to 10% prejudgment interest (simple no 
compounded) from April 15, 2005 through October 1, 2007, the date upon which the Court ruled 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to post-judgment interest at the statutory rate commencing on the 
date this ordered is entered. 
Because Plaintiff is the prevailing party herein, it is entitled under the Parties' Agreement 
to its attorney fees and costs. Since Plaintiff has outstanding claims that remain to be tried, the 
Court defers a ruling on the amount of Plaintiff s attorney fees and costs until the conclusion of 
the case and entry of a final judgment. 
[ THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ] 
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E. Conclusion 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED this Z^b day of / W c K 2007. 
THE HONORABLE SAMUEL MCVEY 
DISTRICT^OURT JUDGE 
S^ottX. Mitchell 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
YOUNG LIVING ESSENTIAL OILS, INC., TROPOSEB-FINAL JUDGMENT 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. 060402237 
CARLOS MARIN, an individual, 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Defendant. Division 1 
WHEREFORE, having heard oral arguments on this matter, having considered pleadings, 
prior orders and argument of counsel and pursuant to the Court's Order granting Plaintiffs 
motion for partial summary judgment consistent with the Court's ruling on October 1, 2007, the 
Court hereby enters judgment as follows: 
1. In favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the principle amount of $61,362.43. 
2. Prejudgment interest at 10% per year (simple not compounded) from April 15, 2005 
through October 1, 2007 in the amount of $15,128.48. ($6,136.24 per year; $16.80 per day for 
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two (2) years and 170 days.) 
3. Post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 5.42% from commencing March 26, 
2008, the date Judgment is entered. 
4. As the prevailing party and pursuant to the Parties' Agreement, Plaintiff is entitled to 
its attorney fees and costs in the amount of $45,502,43. {See Affidavit of Attorney Fees and 
Costs filed concurrently with this Proposed Final Judgment.) 
5. Total Judgment in the amount of $121,993.34. 
6. This Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit, including the costs of appeal, pursuant to the contract at issue. 
DATED this /Z- day of Jo ^^ , 20Q8.„, 
THE HON©Rjy3LE 
DISTRICT' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the PROPOSED FINAL 
JUDGMENT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this ^ / day of May, 2008, to the 
following: 
Scott B. Mitchell 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC 
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Attorney for defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the ORDER to be faxed and 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this 20 day of March, 2008, to the following: 
Scott B. Mitchell 
SCOTT B. MITCHELL, PC 
2469 East 7000 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Attorney for defendant 
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